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INTRODUCTION
Ever since its ratification in November1993 by the State Legislature of Kelantan, the Hudud Bill has been the focus of public debate in Malaysia. The Bill has come under criticism both on specific points as well as generally as being eager to inflict punishment and pain. This approach, although a necessary ingredient of a penal policy, needs to be moderated by such other influences that are felt to be equally important in the formulation of a comprehensive philosophy of punishment. To show care and compassion and to provide an opportunity for those who might be ready to repent and reform are among the considerations that have received greater attention in the formulation of a comprehensive penal policy in modern times. Apart from the essential merit of the harmonious approach, the added emphasis on rehabilitation and reform is an acknowledgement on the part of society at large that crime is not a totally isolated phenomenon and that society has increasingly become an unwilling partner in the rising tide of criminality and aggression.
The Qur'anic outlook on punishment may be characterised by its dual emphasis on retribution and reformation. It is my submission that the conventional fiqhi approach to the formulation of the underlying policy toward the hudud has failed to be adequately reflective of the Qur'anic guidance on this subject. And then in its typically imitative and taqlidi orientation, I further submit, that the Hudud Bill of Kelantan has also failed to be reflective either of the balanced outlook of the Qur'an or of the social conditions and realities of contemporary Malaysian society.
This article is presented in five parts. The first part highlights the provisions of the Bill concerning the six hudud offences that will be the focus of our discussion throughout the article. Part two is basically a statement of the problems and it is concerned mainly with the specifics as to where and how could the Hudud Bill be amended and improved. Here I have examined the provisions of the Bill which are in conflict with the Federal Constitution and the Penal Code. Issues are also addressed in this part pertaining to the status of non-Muslims, the proof of zina, 206 ARAB LAW QUARTERLY death as well as the forfeiture of his or her property. The offender will be free of the death sentence, even if it has been passed, if he or she repents; the property will be returned but the defendant would still be liable to imprisonment "not exceeding five years" (Clause 23).
The Bill provides for the establishment of a Special Shari'a Trial Court consisting of three judges, two of whom shall be ulema, and a Special Shari'a Court of Appeal, consisting of five judges, including three ulema. These courts are to be in addition to the Shari'a courts that normally operate in Kelantan. All sentences can be appealed against and sentences are enforceable, in the case of hadd offences, only when confirmed by the Special Appeal Court (Clause 49).
PROBLEMATICS OF THE HUDUD BILL
The Hudud Bill gives rise to three types of problems, one of which is manifested in lack of jurisdiction leading to conflict with the Federal Constitution. Then there are problems relating to the realities of Malaysian society and politics. In the context of a multi-religious society, this Bill raises questions as to whether the nation should be governed by two sets of laws, one for Muslims, the other for nonMuslims! And then the fact that only one of the 13 states of Malaysia has charted a different plan for itself has presented the national government with difficult choices. The other problem here is manifested in the fact that the Bill fails to offer a meaningful alternative as it raises questions over the wisdom of a literalist approach to the understanding of hudud. The Bill exhibits no attempt to exercise ijtihad over new issues, such that would fulfil the ideals of justice and encourage the development of a judicious social policy.
Constitutional issues
The The Shari'a and Hudud Laws Committee of the Malaysian Bar Council announced in early October that the Hudud Bill was consistent with Islamic law, but that there was "inconsistency in certain provisions between hudud laws and the Federal Constitution which can be overcome by amending the Constitution". Following this, the State Government of Kelantan renewed its call and urged the Federal Government to review its decision over rejecting the Hudud Bill.8
The Law Minister, Syed Hamid Albar, stated in a seminar paper he presented in Kuala Lumpur on 14 October 1994 that the Federal Government may introduce a new law "to check inconsistencies" in the legislation of Shari'a law by State Governments. He commented that "Shari'a law should not be treated as a state matter" any more because this had given rise to disparities between the state and federal jurisdictions on the one hand and those of the various states on the other. The Federal Government would consult State Governments and Shari'a experts, the Minister added, before introducing new legislation, which he referred to as the "Hukum Syarak Act".9
To enable the Shari'a Courts to deal with cases of hudud, qisas and diyat, it will be necessary to amend the 9th Schedule, List 2 of the Constitution and repeal the Shari'a Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act. Professor Ahmad Ibrahim who made this observation earlier in 1993 also wrote that another possibility would be for the Federal Government "to enact the hudud, qisas, diyat and ta'zir laws for the purpose of uniformity of laws between the states". But the learned author added that it would not be easy to do this "considering the difficulties and problems arising from the Federal Constitution and the present laws in Malaysia".10
The Federal Government has obviously not taken up the suggestions made earlier by the Kelantan State Government and the Bar Council Committee. Instead of accommodating requests for constitutional amendment to give the State Government of Kelantan a greater say in Shari'a matters, it seems that the Federal Government might well do just the opposite.
The position of non-Muslims
Notwithstanding the attempt in the Hudud Bill (Clause 56) to make the proposed law applicable to Muslims only, and the choice it has granted to non-Muslims to choose if they wish whether the law should apply to them or not, there are questions that have remained unanswered. One of these is concerned, as already indicated, with the issue of jurisdiction. To grant such a choice to non-Muslims tends to fall into conflict with the Federal Constitution which clearly restricts the There is a provision in the Bill concerning abetment and conspiracy by two or more persons in which case, "every person who abets or assists or conspires or plots for the commission of such offence shall be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be punished with imprisonment as ta'zir punishment for a term not exceeding ten years" (Clause 57). This clause is evidently designed to cover the eventuality, as discussed above, of a non-Muslim being a party to the hudud, for the terms "abetment, assistance, conspiracy and plot" are broad enough to comprise every possible case in which a non-Muslim might be involved in the perpetration of a hadd offence.
The non-Muslims of Malaysia have on many occasions expressed apprehension over the manner in which the Shari'a might be interpreted in regards to them. In a Kuala Lumpur seminar held prior to the publication of the Hudud Bill, of which the present writer was a participant, a non-Muslim speaker stated that "Malaysian non-Muslims fear the imposition of the Shari'a", adding that, "if less than 
Issues over rape and the proof of zina
The Bill has come under criticism for its total silence over the problem of rape. While the Bill addressed the subject of zina it did not mention rape at all, presumably because rape has been dealt with in the Penal Code. However, the Bill did not say so and there was no attempt made to show how it proposed to distinguish zina from rape. Zina has, on the other hand, been given a broad definition consisting of "sexual intercourse between a man and a woman who are not married to each other and such intercourse did not come within the meaning of wati syubhah" (Clause 10.1). This last term signifies intercourse in doubtful but unlikely circumstances where the man might have mistaken the woman for his wife or acted in the belief that there was a valid marriage (Clause 10). In the absence of a provision to separate rape from zina, the broad definition of zina in this Bill is likely to subsume rape, in which case the two offences will fall under the same rules. This is all the more likely in view of Clause 46 (2) where it is stated that, "in the case of zina, pregnancy or delivery of a baby by an unmarried woman shall constitute evidence on which to find her guilty of zina and therefore the hudud punishment shall be passed on her unless she can prove to the contrary". This has the potential of equating rape with zina. To apply the rules of zina to rape would mean that the rape victim must bring four male witnesses of just character to prove the charge against her attacker and if she fails to produce the necessary proof, then she would herself be liable to the punishment of qadhf. "To shift the burden of proof to the woman in the case of pregnancy or delivery of a child", as one commentator added, notwithstanding the fact that this clause has been the focus of public criticism and debate, "there appears to be a doggedness on the part of the State Government to retain the Clause as it has been drafted".15
The Bill has also been criticised for its provision concerning the witnesses of zina where it is stated that, "each witness shall be an adult male Muslim who is akil baligh (adult and competent) and shall be a person who is just" (Clause 41). Women have thus been disqualified from being a witness not only in zina but in all the hudud offences. Confession, which is the only other method of admissible proof in hudud, binds not only the confessor and not any other party charged with the same offence -and it can, in any case, be retracted by the accused any time "even while he is undergoing the punishment" (Clause 44). The proof of zina by witnesses is undoubtedly exacting, there being hardly a realistic possibility of it under normal circumstances. Then confession by the accused person which is the more likely alternative, whether in adultery or in rape, is also retractable at any stage of the proceedings.
The dilemma of the rape victim was accentuated by yet another commentator who noted that it was common among rape survivors that they did not seek medical aid immediately out of fear and shame. And it was not uncommon that the rape survivor did not struggle for fear of her own safety or the safety of others who were threatened with her. 16 It was further stated that the Hudud Bill discriminated against women in respect of both zina and rape. We have already explained the plight of the rape victim. As for zina, a charge of zina against a man can be proved by four male eye witnesses or his own confession, there being no other way of proof other than this. But zina of a woman is provable by four male eye witnesses, or her confession, or (being unmarried) by pregnancy or delivery of a child. In the case of a married woman accused of zina by her husband the Bill allows her husband, through the procedure of al-li'an, to disown the child, in which case the marriage will be dissolved even if the wife exercises a counter-oath to rebut the accusation of zina (Clauses 14 and 15).17
Circumstantial evidence
The Bill has also been criticised for its provision which declared that "circumstantial evidence, though relevant, shall not be a valid method of proving a hudud offence" (Clause 46 
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ARAB LAW QUARTERLY therefore not admissible as methods of proof in zina. The Bill thus rejects circumstantial evidence as a method of proof in zina on the one hand and then admits pregnancy or birth of a child -both being circumstantial evidences -as proof of zina on the other. The ulama have differed as to the evidential value of pregnancy in the proof of zina. The majority of jurists have classified pregnancy as a circumstantial evidence (qarinah) indicating the occurrence of zina on the part of an unmarried woman or one who is married but where her husband is incapable of being a fertile partner, or when there is childbirth within the first six months of marriage. Pregnancy is not a decisive circumstantial evidence (qarinah qati'ah) in that it cannot on its own be the basis of adjudication, but it is a qarinah which can be rebutted and overruled by other evidence. The law thus leaves open the possibility of its rebuttal and the court may hear evidence to prove that pregnancy has occurred without zina, or that sexual intercourse has occurred under duress by mistake or even without the knowledge of the defendant. When this is proven the hadd of zina must be suspended, and there may well be no case for any punishment, hadd, or ta'zir. Should there be a possibility that the pregnancy has occurred without penetration, the hadd punishment must again be suspended. This may happen, for example, when semen is planted in a woman by artificial methods, either by her or by another person, or through sex without penetration. The case will be all the more credible if the woman is still found to be a virgin. The Imams Abu Hanifah, Shafi'i and Ibn Hanbal have held that when all of these possibilities are eliminated, the woman should be asked if she has any explanation and if she herself claimed that she was either mistaken or compelled the hadd will be suspended. There will be no hadd punishment even if she did not make such a claim so long as she has not made a full confession, for the hadd can only be enforced by two methods of proof, namely witness or confession. 18 The majority position of admitting pregnancy as a circumstantial evidence is based on the saying of the Companion (qawl al-sahabi), a statement in particular of the caliph 'Umar b. al Khattab who is reported to have said that "rajm is obligatory on anyone who commits zina, man or woman, provided that they are muhsan and that it is proven by witnesses, pregnancy or confession".'9
Imam Malik has, however, considered pregnancy as a conclusive proof of zina above the category of circumstantial evidence or qarinah. The emergence of pregnancy is thus enough to invoke the hadd punishment without confession. Moreover, the defendant's claim as to compulsion and mistake will not be enough to suspend the hadd unless it is confirmed by supportive evidence. The Maliki jurist al-Dusuqi thus wrote that pregnancy was a proof of zina in respect of an unmarried woman or one who was married but the husband was incapable of being a fertile partner in conjugal relations. Thus a woman who is married to a majbub, that is a man whose sexual organ is mutilated, or when a married woman gives birth before the expiry of six months from the date of her marriage, she is regarded, to all intents and purposes, as unmarried and her pregnancy will be taken as proof of zina against her. If she claims compulsion and rape, her claim is not to be admitted and she is liable to punishment unless her claim is supported by circumstantial evidence such as screaming and calling for help. Signs of violence, and bleeding, from loss of virginity or otherwise, is circumstantial evidence, and so is the fact of her alerting others calmly, that is without screaming, at the time of the incident. It is then added that, "the best method of defence is for her to prove her claim of compulsion by the testimony of witnesses.20
The possibilities of accident, error and abuse are in many ways greater today than they were in pre-modern times. I will mention only some of the well-known advances in medicine, such as the availability of artificial insemination and test tube pregnancy, and of semen banks which keep alive and preserve semen for very long periods, and the possibility also that people are often prepared to spend large sums of money either to obtain what they might want or to falsify and fabricate. Although virginity cannot survive actual childbirth, it is possible, according to expert opinion, for sexual intercourse, and also pregnancy, to take place and the hymen to remain intact. Modern medicine has also made it possible to repair, through surgery, the hymen after perforation. The availability of modern medical facilities pertaining to pregnancy, pre-natal care and childbirth has meant that women tend to spend more time in hospital beds and outside the home environment. They are often put under anaesthetics or pain relieving drugs, and so on. Under these circumstances the possibility is even greater for sexual intercourse to take place without a woman's knowledge or even with her knowledge but in circumstances of impaired capacity. It would therefore seem rather presumptuous, and here we refer particularly to Maliki law, to regard pregnancy as a conclusive proof of zina.21 
Issues over apostasy (irtidad)
There
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ARAB LAW QUARTERLY the ulema that has been known to exist ever since the early days of Islam: the view that apostasy is not a hudud but a ta'zir offence is founded on the fact that the death punishment for apostasy is not a Qur'anic mandate. Similarly, the Hadith that provided the sole authority for the death penalty is open to interpretation -which needs to be provided, if it were to be enforced at all. The main Hadith on the issue is that "whoever changes his religion shall be killed".
Would it then be right to say that a Jew who converts to Islam or a Hindu who becomes a Christian should be liable to the death penalty? According to the rules of interpretation that are expounded is usul al-fiqh, once a decisive ruling of the text has been interpreted in some respect the ruling remains open to further levels of interpretation.
The Bill defines irtidad as "any act done or any word uttered by a Muslim who is a mukallaf, being an act or word which according to Syariah law, affects or which is against the 'aqidah (belief) in Islamic religion" (Clause 23 (1)).
The Bill goes on to specify that the act or word in question must be voluntary and that there must be no compulsion. It is further provided that the acts or words that affect the 'aqidah must be such that concern "the fundamental aspects of Islamic religion which are deemed to have been known and believed by every Muslim ... pertaining to the Rukun Islam, Rukun Iman, and matters of halal (the allowable or the lawful) or haram (the prohibited or the unlawful)" (Clause 23). These expressions are all too imprecise and broad to form the basis of definition. There is also nothing in these provisions to draw a distinction between apostasy and blasphemy. The sum total of this approach would be that there will be no difference, for the purpose of enforcing the death penalty under this Bill, between a simple conversion which is neither contemptuous nor hostile and one which inflames the masses of Muslims and is capable of causing bloodshed and uncontrollable civil strife.
As for the Hadith just quoted, it may be specified and the death punishment therein may be reserved for apostasy which is accompanied by active hostility to the community and its leadership of a kind that amounts to high treason (hirabah).22 There is, in fact, authority for this interpretation in another Hadith in which it is clearly stated that the life of a Muslim may be taken in three cases: murder, zina by a married person, and "one who renounces his religion while splitting himself off from the community (mufariq lil-jama'ah)".
A Shaltut, analysed the relevant evidence in the sources and drew the conclusion that apostasy carried no temporal punishment because in reference to apostasy the Qur'an only speaks of punishment in the hereafter. Shaltut also concurred with the analysis that the key factor in the Hadith which prescribed the death penalty for apostasy was "aggression and hostility against the believers and the prevention of a possible fitnah (sedition, civil strife) against the religion and state".24 Mahmassani has also made a similar observation saying that "the death punishment was not meant to apply to a simple change of faith but to punish acts such as treason, joining forces with the enemy, and sedition".25 It is simply remarkable that the Hudud Bill which was drafted, we are told, by a committee of prominent scholars of Shari'a, should ignore important issues on which the ulema have made impressive contributions of a kind that relate more meaningfully to the contemporary conditions of Malaysia and beyond. To turn a blind eye to their zitihad and offer no alternative other than unquestioning imitation can hardly be recommended.
Definition of mul.an
This is yet another feature of the Bill where a reconsideration of the conventional fiqhi position was called for. The Bill defines muhsan as a person who is "validly married and has experienced sexual intercourse in such marriage". A ghairu muhsan is on the other hand one who is not married or "is already married but has not experienced sexual intercourse in such marriage" (Clause 10).
It is difficult to understand that a person is a "muhsan" for the purposes of this Bill if he or she has at any time experienced sexual intercourse, there being no reference to the current state of the marriage at the time when the offence is committed. It thus matters little if a person, although once married, has separated or even divorced and had no access to his/her spouse for a long time. If the logic of imposing a severe punishment on a married person is that he or she can have lawful sexual relations with his or her spouse, then this logic can only hold if the culprit has committed zina during a valid and effective marriage. But if the reason behind this punishment (death by stoning), is that the person has experienced lawful sexual relations, even if only once, then it is difficult to understand the continuity of the state of ihsan in such a case.26 Muhammad Abduh and his disciple Rashid Rida have held that the punishment of zina is only applicable to offenders who at the time of committing the offence were parties to a valid marriage. As for the 23 
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offender who has been married once but is no longer so, he or she should be punished lightly or at most only the same as that of the unmarried offender.27
The fuqaha have premised the distinction between muhsan and non-muhsan on the somewhat exacting rationale that once a person has experienced the bounty and joy of marriage he is bound to be eager to safeguard and protect the sanctity of that precious relationship38 What about the other side of this argument: one who has experienced such a relationship but has seen it terminated or dissolved is likely to find it even harder to resist the temptation! Abu Zahrah has concluded from his own enquiry into this issue that there is no clear text to determine that a woman who has been divorced or a man whose wife has died should be classified as muhsan. Abu Zahrah also refers to the views of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida and then concurs with them in saying that "a muhsan is a person who is protected, in the case of a woman, by her husband and when there is a separation, or divorce, she no longer qualifies as a muhsanah in the same way as she is no longer a mutazawwijah, or a married woman".29
The punishment of theft The Bill penalises the first offence of theft with amputation of the right hand from the wrist. The second offence of theft is punishable with amputation of a part of the left foot "in the middle of the foot in such a way that the heel may still be usable for walking and standing" (Clauses 6 and 52).
The leading schools offiqh have admittedly validated amputation of the left foot for the second offence. But this is disputable, and there is a minority opinion against it, for the simple reason that the Qur'an has not validated it. Two prominent Companions, Ibn 'Abbas and 'Ata, are reported to have held that no further amputation is valid for the second (and subsequent) theft, and supported this by citing the Qur'anic text, "And your Lord is never forgetful" (Maryam, 19:64). Ibn Hazm has strongly criticised the majority ruling here and said that it is quite remarkable that such drastic positions are taken (mainly by the Hanafis and Malikis) without there being any evidence in the sources to support them.30 ElAwa's enquiry into this has also led him to the conclusion that the minority opinion here is "nearest to the spirit of Islamic law".31 Our guideline on this issue should surely be the Hadith of the Prophet, discussed below, that if there is a choice between leniency and severity, we should, in the context of punishments especially, adopt the course which leads to leniency and not otherwise. 
PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW 217
The Bill has completely ignored the possibility of tawbah or repentance and this issue is further discussed in the context of tawbah below. It has also not taken into account the arguments of al-Qaradawi, al-Ghazali, and al-Zarqa, about the punishment of theft in modem society. The drafters of this Bill seem to have merely translated al-Mawardi's, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah, with no effort at ijtihad nor consideration of the realities of modem life in Malaysia. I have also quoted below Abu Zahrah, Maududi, El-Awa, and Bassiouni, all of whom raise serious doubts as to whether justice would be served by the implementation of these penalties in contemporary Muslim societies.
Should drinking wine be a hadd?
The basic issue over shurb is that it does not belong in the category of hudud, and that the evidence for classifying it under the hudud is controversial. The Bill has, of course, identified shurb as a hudud offence which is punishable with "whipping of not more than eighty lashes but not less than forty lashes" (Clause 22).
Although shurb has been declared forbidden in the Qur'an, the latter has not specified any particular punishment for it. The evidence in the Sunnah also indicates that the Prophet has not treated shurb as a hadd offence. Drinking wine was a common habit among the Arabs which is why the Qur'an initially adopted a persuasive approach advising people of the ill-effects of drinking wine and subsequently discouraged it nearer the prayer time, and it was only in the third of the three separated ayat that it was declared totally forbidden. The Prophet s.a.w. also imposed different types of punishments for shurb, and reports indicate that offenders were in most cases subjected to beating.
Reports further confirm that when Abu Bakr was faced with the issue he asked the Companions but they did not know of any precise punishment for shurb. Notwithstanding this, and confirmation by a number of ulema, including Ibn Qayyim, al-Jawziyyah, Al-Shawkani, and Ibn Farhun, the majority of jurists have not only classified shurb as a hadd offence but have claimed a general consensus (ijma') on its punishment to have been fixed at 80 lashes -which is evidently not the case. In their recent writings scholars, including Mustafa Shalabi, Fathi Bahnasi, Salim al-Awwa, and others, have stated that the alleged ijma' on shurb being a hadd offence is incorrect and have held that it is a ta'zir offence. The basic argument for this being that hadd is by definition an offence for which a fixed punishment is prescribed in the Qur'an or Sunnah.32 When this is not the case, the whole concept of hadd collapses. When we compare the Qur'anic usage of hadd with the use of this term in fiqh, we notice that a basic development has taken place, which is that the term hadd has been reserved to signify a fixed and unchangeable punishment that is laid down in the Qur'an or Sunnah. The concept of the "separating or preventing limit" of the Qur'an is thereby replaced by the idea of fixed punishment. 35 Hadd according to its fiqhi definition is "a quantitatively fixed punishment which is imposed for a violation of the Right of God". Hadd is thus signified as a fixed punishment in contradistinction with ta'zir, which is neither fixed nor quantified. It is also a Right of God in contradistinction with qisas (just retaliation) which is a Right of Man. Hadd as a Right of God signifies a demand from God that requires fulfilment and no one therefore has the authority to pardon or suspend it.36
Of the 14 instances where hudud are used in the Qur'an, no less than six occur in just one passage on the subject of divorce, which is as follows.
Divorce (may be given) twice. Thereafter, either retain (the wife) according to good custom (bi'l-ma'ruf) or release her with kindness. And it is not lawful for you to take back anything you have given her unless the couple fear that they may transgress God's limits (hudud Allah). If there is fear that they may transgress hudud Allah, they commit no sin if the wife willingly gives anything back. These are hudud Allah, do not transgress them. Those who transgress hudud Allah, they are unjust. But if he (the husband) divorces her, she will not be lawful to him thereafter until she marries another man. If he (the second husband) divorces her, there is no harm if the two return to each other,. if they think they can observe hudud Allah. And these are the hudud Allah which He makes clear for a people who know (al-Baqarah, 2: 229-30).
The term hudud Allah carries slightly different meanings in its various applications above. While the idea of limits may be said to be common to all, in its uses 2, 3, and 6, it refers to the specific injunctions contained in the body of the text. Uses 1, 4, and 5, do not refer to anything specifically stated, let alone enjoined, either here, or indeed elsewhere, in the Qur'an. In other words, when the Qur'an speaks of observing hudud Allah it states neither here nor elsewhere specifically what these "limits" are.
With reference to marital relations, the Qur'an demands a conduct which is in accord with good custom (bi'l-ma'ruf). This is not to say that there are no other injunctions concerning marital relations in the Qur'an, but for the purposes of this text, hudud Allah is a general reference to the total conduct of marital life which is 220 ARAB LAW QUARTERLY conveyed by the term bi'l-ma'ruf. The content of good custom in this context is thus included in the general meaning of hudud Allah.
Two more points to note in this passage are: firstly that the term hudud has no reference to punishment, but is concerned mainly with a moral situation which may or may not have legal implications. Secondly, the content of "good custom" is evidently liable to change and does not fit in with the idea of a fixed and invariable provision. This must also imply that the content of hudud Allah is variable to that extent and that it is conceptually amenable to comprising changeable provisions.37
In two other places (al-Baqarah, 2: 187 and al-Talaq 65:1) the term hudud Allah is concerned with marital relations; the first with conjugal relations during the fasting month of Ramadan and the second with the waiting period (i.e. 'iddah) that the wife must observe following a divorce. The text in both places warns against violating hudud Allah. Elsewhere the expression occurs in a passage where the text recommends kindness to the orphans and the needy and specifies fixed shares in inheritance for legal heirs, and then declares that these are the hudud Allah that must be observed (al-Nisa, 4:12-13).
Hudud Allah also occurs in the Qur'an in reference to atonement (kaffarah) in conjunction with zihar. This is a form of divorce, originally a pre-Islamic practice, where the husband declares his wife to be unlawful to him 'like the back of his mother". The kaffarah that the husband needs to observe in the event of resuming marital relations consists of one of the following three: to release a slave, to fast for 60 consecutive days, or to feed 60 poor persons. The text then proceeds to declare that "these are God's limits (hudud Allah) and for disbelievers is a painful torture (al-Mujadilah, 58:3-5). It is of interest to note here the use of hudud Allah in reference to a specific but self-imposed punishment which does not involve the enforcement authorities but only the individual himself. Moreover, by suggesting alternative atonements for zihar the Qur'an seems to admit the idea of alternative/ variable punishment for hudud Allah in line with the ability and condition of the persons who observe the kaffarah in question.
The "Divine Limits" (hudud Allah), according to Maududi, consist of certain principles, checks and balances, and specific injunctions in different spheres of life -and they have been prescribed in order that man may be trained to lead a balanced and moderate life. They are intended to lay down the basic framework within which man is free to legislate, decide his own affairs and frame subsidiary laws and regulations for his conduct.38
It is thus evident that the Qur'anic concepts of hudud and hudud Allah are not meant to consist of punishments, nor of purely punitive and mandatory sanctions. They are used in the Qur'an to imply a set of broad moral and legal guidelines which must be observed and upheld. The basic concern is clearly with the moral limits of conduct in the sense of identifying what is generally good and righteous as opposed to that which must be avoided and discouraged.
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The Qur'an's emphasis on repentance (tawbah)
In virtually all the four instances where the Qur'an specifies a punishment for an offence, there is also a provision for repentance, forgiveness and reformation. This is a consistent feature of the penal philosophy of the Qur'an which has, however, not been adequately reflected in the juristic doctrine of the fuqaha, nor indeed in the Hudud Bill of Kelantan. Notwithstanding the dual emphasis that the Qur'an lays on punishment and repentance, juristic doctrine pays undivided attention to the enforcement of punishment so much so that once the offender has been convicted of a hadd offence repentance is of no account and no one has the authority to pardon him. But we read a different message in the Qur'an. Thus the text (al-Ma'idah, 5:38-39) which penalises the thief with mutilation continues to provide, "But if the thief repents after his crime and amends his conduct, God redeems him. God is forgiving, most merciful". The reference to repentance in the text is immediately followed by the word 'aslaha' (reforms himself) and the two together would seem to require that the convict should not only be given time in which repentance and reformation can occur but also that this should be facilitated, on a selective basis at least, by positive incentives.
Abu Zahrah wrote in a commentary that the Qur'anic text on theft begins with 'al-sariq wa'l-sariqah' and these are adjectives, not verbs, and adjectives do not materialise in a person without a measure of repetition. A person is not, for example, described as "generous", "honest", or "liar", merely by a single act of generosity, honesty, or lying. These adjectives carry their full meanings when there is recurrence and repetition. The ayah did not begin by saying, for example, that theft is punishable with such and such a punishment; if refers instead to sariq and sariqah. When we read the ayah from this perspective, then the punishment that it conveys should apply to recidivists but not to first time offenders. According to a report when the Caliph 'Umar al-Khattab decided to mutilate the hand of a young offender, his mother said: "pardon him O Commander of the faithful, because it was his first time". To this the Caliph responded, "Allah is too merciful to reveal the nakedness of His servant for his first failure". Abu Zahrah has also discussed, in this connection, the issue of repentance where he observed that the wording of the text before us is such that repentance can only find a logical place in it, if it is given an opportunity before the imposition of punishment. This he adds is not the view of the majority but it is a view that is sustainable by the text and some ulema have in fact arrived at this conclusion.39
The Qur'anic emphasis on tawbah can also be seen it its ayat on adultery and slanderous accusation (al-Nur, 24: 2-6) respectively: reference to punishment in each case is immediately followed by "unless they repent thereafter and mend their conduct" and "except for those who repent thereafter and reform themselves". 
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imposition of punishment and not before. To this it is further added that when the Prophet ordered stoning in the cases of Ma'iz and al-Ghamidyyah, or when he adjudicated in certain cases of theft, on the basis of confession, the offenders in these cases had all shown signs of repentance as many of them had said that they wished to be purified of their sins but that the Prophet nevertheless enforced the hadd punishment on them.42 (3) The third view, which is mainly attributed to Ibn Taymiyyah and his disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, has it that punishment purifies one from criminality and sin, and so does repentance. That punishment should be suspended when the perpetrator of a Right of God offence repents and in the meantime does not himself insist that only punishment can purify him of his guilt. But if he does so insist, then he or she may be punished even after repentance. Hence, when the perpetrator of a hadd offence repents prior to completing the crime, he or she will not be punished if the offence in question is a public right, or Right of God, offence, provided also that the offender does not demand to be punished.43
When we look at the evidence in the Sunnah we find that the Prophet has on many occasions tried to persuade individuals who had confessed to a hadd offence to retract their confession and find a way out for them of their punitive predicament, presumably because confession is often indicative of repentance and the Prophet s.a.w. has positively encouraged it. Notwithstanding this, only in the case of apostasy can it be said that repentance has found a place in the juristic doctrine, but only just so, because imposing a strict time limit of three days (cf. Clause 23[3] of the Hudud Bill) within which the offender must repent is really reducing the concept of repentance into a mechanical formality that is almost meaningless.
Juristic thinking over the hudud were caught, as from early times it seems, in a web of technicality, partly because of linking the hudud with the binary division of rights into Rights of God and Rights of Man in a manner that created more problems than otherwise. Juristic developments in this area have followed a course which seems to have made it difficult to integrate the Qur'anic outlook on repentance and reform to the underlying philosophy of hudud.
It seems that the Qur'an's repeated emphasis on repentance has caught the attention of Ibn Hazm who wrote in a distinctly different tone of language to that of the majority of ulema. Thus, according to Ibn Hazm: Since repentance is ordained by God and it is highly recommended, it is obligatory on all Muslims (kana fardan 'ala kull muslim) to invoke it in accordance with the injunctions (alnusus) that were discussed. Hence inviting the offender to repent prior to the enforcement of 224 ARAB LAW QUARTERLY hadd is an obligation and diligence in it is a duty ..... If the Imam failed to invite the offender to repent prior to enforcement, an invitation to repentance should still be extended after the enforcement of hadd.44
If we were to extend the juristic concept of hadd to the broad Qur'anic philosophy of reformation and repentance, we would have to depart from the notion of fixed and mandatory provisions of universal application. It would be possible perhaps to combine the Qur'anic directives on reformation and repentance with the notion of fixed penalties, or a range of quantified penalties. It would be difficult, however, to integrate into this approach the notion of both fixed and mandatory sentences that are totally closed to the attendant conditions and circumstances of individual offenders.
Hadd and haqq Allah in the juristic expositions of fiqh
As already indicated the ulema have defined hadd as a fixed punishment imposed for violation of the Right of God. The Hudud Bill also describes hudud as "offences, the punishments of which are ordained by the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah", and then it further specifies that the hudud punishments, "shall not be suspended, substituted for any other punishment, reduced or pardoned or otherwise varied or altered" (Clause 48). The other two categories of offences with which this Bill is exclusively concerned are qisas and ta'zir offences respectively.
By defining hadd as a fixed punishment ('uqubah muqaddrah) it is meant that the punishment is invariably specified and fixed, and not fixed, as it were, in the sense of fixing the minimum and maximum limits thereof. In ta'zir punishment the authorities are entitled to exercise discretion as to determining the type and quantity of punishment. Protecting the vital interest of the community may be said to be the basic objective of all punishment, including qisas, diyyah, and ta'zir, yet while this is generally acknowledged, it is suggested that compared to the hudud, offences in these other categories are not crucial for protecting the basic fabric of society, and that they relate more closely to the rights and interests of individuals than that of the community as a whole.45 'Abd al-Qadir 'Awdah merely expounded the conventional view when he wrote that theft, shurb, highway robbery, rebellion, zina, and apostasy pose a greater threat to society than the pain and grief that might be inflicted on victims. The victim of theft may lose his property but his grief is relatively less than the threat of terror and insecurity that is inflicted on his neighbours and fellow citizens. As for crimes such as "murder and injury, they affect individuals more than society and these are to some extent personal crimes in the sense that their perpetrators do not face everyone they meet with violence but confine their aggression to a particular individual".46 The rationale we are faced with here does not really bear out and would in any case seem to have lost much of its relevance in conjunction with contemporary social realities, for it is hard to understand the assertion that killing and bodily injury represent a lesser threat to society than such other crimes as zina and qadhf.
When we look at the hudud as a separate category of punishment in contradistinction with qisas, we are reminded of the conditions that prevailed in the tribal society of Arabia at the time of the advent of Islam, in which the scope and manner of the application of qisas, where personal vendetta and tribalist urge for revenge needed to be checked and controlled. The emphasis was clearly on the objectivity of justice independent of tribalist and sectarian interests. The hudud would appear to have served this purpose in that they took the law in regard to a certain number of crimes out of the scope of tribal justice and the message was clearly conveyed that these are not open to negotiation, compromise and pardoning. But when we consider that the course of history has altered the picture and that changes have taken place as a result of such developments as urbanisation on a massive scale, communications, and modern methods of government etc. -we find that the basic rationale of the early distinctions has been substantially eroded. While criminality remains a serious threat to the fabric of modem society and civilisation, there is no compelling argument to confine this only to a handful of specified or unspecified crimes. The changing conditions of society have never ceased to generate new problems, new opportunities for crime, and unprecedented varieties of criminal conduct which are often no less of a threat to the basic fabric of society and its values as the hudud crimes.
Basically all rights in Islam, as the Maliki jurist al Qarafi pointed out, consist primarily of the Right of God, which are in turn exercised and represented by the community of believers and their lawful government.47 We may conclude therefore that all crimes consist of the violation of the limits of God, the hudud Allah, and that the community and its leadership are within their rights to take all necessary measures to defend their common interests against criminality and violence without the need to draw hard and fast divisions between public and private interests. We may also say that there remains no urgent need for distinguishing the Right of God from the Right of Man, nor of hudud crimes on this basis alone, from other offences that are equally if not more threatening to public security and interest. Muhammad al-Ghazali has advanced a similar argument and fminds certain aspects of the debate on the enforcement of hudud to be less than acceptable and convicing. "We do not dispute", wrote al-Ghazali, "that the hudud are a part of Islam, but we find it strange that they are considered to be the whole of it".65 To enforce the hudud, we need to establish an Islamic political order first. Ghazali went on to comment, "we wish to see these punishments enforced ... but not so that the hand of a petty thief be cut while those punishments are waived in cases of embezzlement of fantastic funds from public treasury".66
These In certain other circumstances, shubha may suspend the principal punishment of hadd but a lesser punishment may still be imposed. Thus, when a person steals from the public treasury, or when the father steals from his son, the hadd of theft is suspended but the judge may consider imposing a lesser punishment of ta'zir. Similarly, a person who retracts his or her confession is acquitted of hadd but may still be punished under ta'zir. 71 It thus appears that the fiqhi interpretations of shubha in the Hadith under discussion have included a wide range of circumstances which the ulema perceived as "doubt" in light of the prevailing conditions of their time. It is perhaps a mere extension of the same logic for us to extend the application of the Hadith-cumlegal maxim to our contemporary conditions. Bearing in mind the general language of the Hadith which is not specific to the evidential process alone, it is perhaps doubt of any kind, within or outside the judicial process, that would fall within the purpose and cautionary advice of this Hadith. The circumstances of modem society, as I discussed above, the ubiquitous temptation to sin on the one hand, rampant secularity and a total absence of the necessary context and conditions for the enforcement of hudud, on the other, do, I believe, present us with a doubtful situation that would fall within the broad meaning and purpose of the Hadith. When we apply the ruling of that Hadith in a total sense then the hudud would automatically be reduced to ta'zir which can include a variety of punishments that the legislature and court might consider most suitable for purposes of reformation and deterrence.
CONCLUSION
The Hudud Bill is a product of undiluted imitation (taqlid) failing to acknowledge the contemporary realities of Malaysian society, and make necessary adjustments to some of thefiqhi formulations of pre-modern times. In discussing the provisions of this Bill I have specified where and how an ijtihadi approach to legal adjustment and reform could beneficially be taken. But specific measures in iltihad should always be guided by the broader vision and objectives of Shari'a. With this purpose in mind, I have advanced a certain perspective over the understanding of hudud in the Qur'an and Sunnah, where I highlighted some of the most neglected and yet vitally important aspects of the Qur'an that merit our attention in the formulation of a comprehensive Islamic philosophy of punishment. The gap between the ideal and reality and between the theory and practice of Shari'a has grown so wide as to make attention to particularities of legal practice relatively insignificant at a time when the Shari'a as a whole is being challenged as being irrelevant to the concerns of modern society. The question naturally arises whether the attempt on the part of the State Government of Kelantan, even if it succeeds, is not likely to make the Shari'a an object of fear at a time when our efforts should be in the direction of emphasising the more compassionate and humanitarian teachings of Islam that are universally appealing. At its present time in history and in face of the crisis that has afflicted the liberality and calibre of Islamic thought, the ummah is faced with difficult choices. We either choose to retain the eternal message of Islam, to uphold its civilisational ideals, and invest our energy in the task of reconstructing a society in that image, or lower our sights to see only the concrete rules and specific details. This latter alternative is not only unwise but also methodologically unsound as it attaches higher priority to details and makes them the focus of attention at the expense of the broader and more important objectives of Islam. Islam's commitment to moral virtue, to justice, to equality and freedom, to the realisation of benefit, and to the promotion of humanitarian and compassionate values, are of universal and perpetual significance. Failing to understand these will inevitably lead to the misapprehension and misinterpretation of Islam and its criminal justice. To believe that Islam is static is to deny it universality and transcendence. By the same token, to believe that true Islam is only how it was applied in medieval times is as erroneous as the secularist assertion that it is no longer relevant to modern society. To fall into the trap of literalism such that would blur our vision of the ideals and objectives of Shari'a (maqasid al-shari'ah) in total dedication to specific details violates the wisdom and hikhmah of Islam which takes such a high profile in the Qur'an and the exemplary Sunnah of the Prophet.
To devise effective deterrents against criminality and aggression must be the overriding objective of an Islamic penal policy, just as they are of the hudud penalties. The deterrent and punitive efforts need also to be moderated with considerations of care and compassion, such that would nurture the prospects of reformation and return, whenever possible, to normal life in society. If this is undertaken with diligence, then I believe that the Muslim community would have observed the basic purpose and meaning of hudud Allah. If the specific punishments are temporarily suspended for fear of indulgence in uncertainty and doubt, while in the meantime efforts are made which would pave the way for a more comprehensive understanding and implementation of Shari'a, this would be a worthwhile endeavour and, I believe, ultimately more meaningful.
And finally, the analysis that I have presented in this enquiry does not affect the existing structure of punishments for offences that fall under the category of ta'zir. The very philosophy of ta'zir accommodates the combination of deterrent and reformative objectives that the Qur'an has advocated for combating crime. The only proviso to note here is that my use of the terms hadd and ta'zir is only meant to refer to the former as a fixed, and the latter as a variable, punishmentand not necessarily to invoke the conventional juristic details that are attached to these terms. The government and the ulu al-amr are within their rights to introduce legislation that might seek to regulate the proper application of ta'zir both as a concept and a methodology of punishment. Muslim jurists have not emphasised custodial sentences to the same extent as they have been emphasised in Western jurisprudence, and I believe that this should remain a guideline for sentencing in ta'zir offences. Prison sentences should be available, of course, but should not be relied upon as a principal instrument of Islamic penal policy. The government policy in administering ta'zir should be formulated in the true spirit of a Shari'a-oriented policy or siyasah shar'iyyah, that seeks to administer justice, establish good government, and fight criminality and corruption by all means at its disposal and in all reasonable ways that are deemed to realise the best interest (maslahah) of the community. As a principle of public policy, the hallmark of siyasah shar'iyyah must always be its pursuit and realisation of the overriding values and objectives (al-maqasid) of the Shari'a.72 It should be the manifest purpose of such a policy, in the area particularly of criminal law including the hudud, to facilitate necessary adjustment in the law so as to bring the conventional formulations of penal law in line with the Qur'anic vision of the basic objectives and philosophy of punishment.
